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Abstract
Attending where others gaze is one of the most fundamental mechanisms of social cognition. The present study is the first
to examine the impact of the attribution of mind to others on gaze-guided attentional orienting and its ERP correlates. Using
a paradigm in which attention was guided to a location by the gaze of a centrally presented face, we manipulated
participants’ beliefs about the gazer: gaze behavior was believed to result either from operations of a mind or from a
machine. In Experiment 1, beliefs were manipulated by cue identity (human or robot), while in Experiment 2, cue identity
(robot) remained identical across conditions and beliefs were manipulated solely via instruction, which was irrelevant to the
task. ERP results and behavior showed that participants’ attention was guided by gaze only when gaze was believed to be
controlled by a human. Specifically, the P1 was more enhanced for validly, relative to invalidly, cued targets only when
participants believed the gaze behavior was the result of a mind, rather than of a machine. This shows that sensory gain
control can be influenced by higher-order (task-irrelevant) beliefs about the observed scene. We propose a new
interdisciplinary model of social attention, which integrates ideas from cognitive and social neuroscience, as well as
philosophy in order to provide a framework for understanding a crucial aspect of how humans’ beliefs about the observed
scene influence sensory processing.
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Introduction
Being inherently embedded in a social environment, humans
have developed means to efficiently read out signals that others
convey, to optimize social interactions. For example, humans (and
other primates [1,2]) use gaze to communicate intentions, signal
behaviorally relevant locations (e.g., of a potential threat), and
establish joint attention in social interactions. Since gaze plays
such an important social role, the human brain has developed
specialized mechanisms enabling detection of gaze direction and
attending where others gaze: superior temporal sulcus (STS)
encodes gaze direction information (e.g., [3], see also [4] for a
review), while gaze-induced attentional orienting is realized
through interactions of STS with intraparietal sulcus (IPS, [4]).
In laboratory settings, the mechanism of attending to where
others gaze has been examined using gaze-cueing paradigms (e.g., [5–
7]). Typically, gaze cueing involves a centrally presented face,
whose eyes shift direction to one of the visual hemifields.
Subsequently, a target is presented either at the gazed-at location
(validly cued) or at another location (invalidly cued). In line with a
common pattern of results in a standard Posner-cueing paradigm
(e.g., [8,9]), target-related performance is typically better for
validly, relative to invalidly, cued locations (cue validity effect).
A neural mechanism underlying the validity effect has been
identified as sensory gain control [10,11], which increases the signal-
to-noise ratio for stimuli at attended, relative to other, locations
[12,13]. Sensory gain control has been examined using single-unit
neurophysiology [14], neuroimaging [15], and psychophysics [16],
providing converging evidence that attention influences sensory
processing by amplifying stimulus-related neuronal signals. Based
on the event-related potential (ERP) technique of scalp-recorded
EEG, the P1-N1 complex at posterior-occipital electrode sites has
been identified as the ERP index of the sensory gain control. For
example, Mangun and colleagues [10] observed that when spatial
attention was deployed to a location, stimuli subsequently
presented there elicited enhanced P1 and N1 components relative
to stimuli at other locations. The sensory gain mechanism has
been studied extensively using a variety of procedures designed to
modulate spatial attention: exogeneous cues [17], central cueing
[18,19]; sustained attention [10], or directional gaze [20].
However, the actual sources of attentional control over sensory
processing and the question of whether sensory gain is sensitive to
task-irrelevant higher-order cognitive processes remain to be
examined.
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether task-
irrelevant beliefs about the observed scene can modulate the
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sensory gain control. In our paradigm, attention was guided to a
location by the gaze direction of a centrally presented face, and we
manipulated beliefs regarding whether the face’s gaze behavior
resulted from the operations of a mind or of a machine. Crucially,
these beliefs were entirely irrelevant to the task, and were
manipulated either by cue identity (Experiment 1: presenting a
human or a robot face) or solely by instruction, with cue identity
remaining identical across conditions (Experiment 2: presenting
only a robot face but informing participants that its gaze behavior
was either human-controlled or pre-programmed). We reasoned
that attentional control over sensory gain would be enhanced
when the gaze behavior was believed to result from the operations
of a mind, rather than a machine, as attending to locations gazed-
at by an intentional agent is adaptive from the social and
evolutionary perspective. Our reasoning followed Tomasello’s
distinction between two types of intention communicated through
gaze: referential and social [21]. The first concerns the object of
attention, the second why attention is directed to this object. The
idea is that gaze behavior is usually only informative when it
originates from a mind, because mental states not only cause gaze
behavior, but also give meaning to it (the ‘‘why’’). Consequently, if
observers believe that an agent with a mind is directing gaze to a
location, they may expect something relevant for communication
at that location, and thus allocate their attention there. By
contrast, if observers believe that a machine is directing ‘‘eyes’’ to a
location, they may not allocate their attention there because the
machine’s gaze behavior is not attributable to the operations of a
mind and thus lacks communicative content. Previous findings
showed that gaze-guided attentional orienting can be modulated
by attribution of particular mental states to the observed agent
[22,23]. Moreover, Wiese, Wykowska, and colleagues [24] showed
that the general likelihood of attributing mind towards an
observed agent influences gaze cueing effects. However, the
present study is the first one designed to examine how neural
mechanisms underlying gaze-related attentional orienting are
modulated by higher-order (task-irrelevant) cognitive processes,
such as beliefs about the observed scene. Importantly, by focusing
on the sensory gain control, which is a mechanism of early




The experiments were conducted at the LMU Munich
Department of Psychology (Laboratory of Experimental Psychol-
ogy), where all experimental procedures that involve data
collection from healthy adult participants and that do not involve
invasive or potentially dangerous methods have been approved by
the Department’s ethics committee in accordance with the Code
of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of
Helsinki). Data were stored and analyzed anonymously. Partici-
pants gave their informed written consent and were either paid or
received course credit for participating.
Stimuli and apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch computer screen with a
100-Hz refresh rate, placed at a distance of 80 cm from the
observer. In the human-face condition of Experiment 1, a digitized
photo, 5.7u65.7u of visual angle in size, of the face of the same
female individual, chosen from the Karolinska Directed Emotional
Faces (KDEF, [25]) database (face F 07), was used, see [24] for the
illustration of the female face stimulus. In the robot-face condition
of Experiments 1 and 2, a photo of an anthropomorphic robot
(EDDIE, LSR, TU München), of the same size as the human face,
was presented.
Both human and robot faces were presented frontally without
changes in head orientation. To produce gaze direction cues, irises
and pupils within the eyes were shifted (using PhotoshopTM) left-
or rightwards to deviate by 0.2u from straight-ahead gaze, in both
the human and the robot condition. Stimuli were presented
centrally on a white background, with eyes positioned on the
central horizontal axis of the screen. The midpoints of the human
and robot faces were positioned 0.2u and, respectively, 1.1u below
the central horizontal axis; this slight difference in positioning with
respect to the y-axis ensured that the peripheral target letters were
always presented at the same level as the eyes of the human or
robot face on the central horizontal axis. The target stimulus was a
black capital letter (F or T), 0.2u60.2u in size, which was presented
on the central horizontal axis at an eccentricity of 5.7u with respect
to the screen center (Figure 1). Target positions (left or right) were
determined pseudo-randomly such that targets appeared with
equal frequency at either of the two positions.
Gaze direction was not predictive of the target position, that is:
in Experiment 1, on target-present trials (80% in total), gaze was
directed either to the side on which the target appeared (valid
trials, 33% of target-present trials) or to the other side (invalid
trials, 33% of target-present trials), or it remained gazing straight-
ahead, with targets equally likely appearing on either side (neutral
trials, 33% of target-present trials). The neutral condition was
introduced in order to examine for possible differential effects
related to physical dissimilarities between the human and robot
conditions. In Experiment 2, neutral trials were not included in the
design. That is, the face could gaze to only the left or the right
(50% trials with each direction, in target-present trials), with the
target presented either on the right or on the left side of the screen.
In both experiments, 20% of all trials were catch trials (no target
presented). These target-absent trials were introduced to permit
subtraction of the EEG signal on target-absent trials from that on
target-present trials, so as to eliminate ERP potentials elicited by
the cue, which overlapped with potentials related to the target.
Experimental design
A trial started with a fixation point (2 pixels) presented for
850 ms. Subsequently, a face with gaze directed straight-ahead
(towards the observer) appeared on the screen for 850 ms, while
the fixation dot remained visible (in-between the face’s eyes). The
straight-ahead gazing face was followed by a gaze shift (cue) to the
left or the right (valid and invalid trials), or the gaze remained
straight ahead (neutral trials) for another 600 ms. Next, the target
letter was presented on either the left or the right side of the
screen, at a fixed stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 600 ms
relative to the onset of the gaze cue. Following this event, the face
and target remained on the screen for another 30 ms only, in
order to minimize eye movements in the critical time window.
Participants were then asked to respond as quickly and accurately
as possible to the identity of the target letter (F or T) using the ‘o’
or, respectively, the ‘i’ key on a standard keyboard (all other letters
were removed and the o/i letters were covered with green/blue
stickers), with response assignment (o = F/i = T vs. o = T/i = F)
counterbalanced across participants. The keys were to be pressed
with the index finger of the left and the right hand, respectively.
The display was blank for the duration of response. Upon
response, another trial started with the presentation of the fixation
dot in the screen center. On target-absent trials, no response was
required and the trial continued (blank screen) for another 800 ms.
Participants were informed that the gaze (shift) direction of the cue
provider was not predictive with respect to the actual target
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position, in either the human or robot face conditions of
Experiment 1 or, respectively, the human-controlled or pre-
programmed robot conditions of Experiment 2. For an illustration
of the trial sequence, see Figure 1.
EEG recording
EEG was recorded with Ag-AgCl electrodes from 64 electrodes
of an active-electrode system (ActiCap, Brain Products, GmbH,
Munich, Germany), at a sampling rate of 500 Hz. Horizontal and
vertical EOG were recorded bipolar from the outer canthi of the
eyes and from above and below the observer’s left eye,
respectively. All electrodes were referenced to Cz and re-
referenced offline to the average of all electrodes. Electrode
impedances were kept below 5 kV, and the EEG activity was
amplified with a band-pass filter of 0.1 to 250 Hz using BrainAmp
amplifiers (Brain Products, GmbH, Munich).
Experiment 1
Participants
Sixteen volunteers took part in the Experiment 1 (5 women;
mean age: 24 years; age range: 20 to 30 years; all right-handed;
and all with normal or corrected-to-normal vision; none of the
observers had taken part in an experiment with such a paradigm
before); they received an honorarium for their participation. The
experiment was conducted with the full understanding and written
consent of each participant. Experimental procedures were in
accordance with the Code of Ethics of the World Medical
Association (Declaration of Helsinki). Data of two participants had
to be discarded due to technical problems during recording of the
EEG data.
Procedure
Participants were seated in a dimly lit chamber with a keyboard
under their hands. Experiment 1 consisted of 900 trials and all
conditions were randomly mixed within 10 blocks of 90 trials each.
No specific instruction was given to participants regarding the type
of cue (human vs. robot).
Data analysis
We hypothesized that the directional gaze shift would guide
attention to the gazed-at location. Hence, we expected validity
effects (superior performance, and enhanced amplitudes of the P1-
N1 ERP complex, for valid- vs. invalid-cue trials). Moreover, we
expected the validity effects to be modulated by cue type – the
rationale being that gaze following makes more sense if the gaze
potentially conveys communicative content, relative to when it
only reflects mechanistic behavior. In sum, the main factors of
interest for all our analyses were: cue validity (valid vs. invalid) and
cue type (human vs. robot). The analyses focused on valid and
invalid trials, as neutral trials did not constitute a proper baseline –
owing to the fact that in gaze cueing paradigms with naturalistic
stimuli, neutral, straight-ahead gaze towards the observer is special
in that it may induce an arousal effect and/or exert a holding
effect on attention, making it difficult to disengage attention (from
the central, straight-ahead gazing face) and shift it to the
peripheral target [24,26,27]. Neutral trials were only analysed
with respect to main effect of cue type, in order to examine for
differential effects related to physical dissimilarities of the cue
stimuli.
EEG data. The data were averaged over a 700-ms epoch
including a 200-ms pre-stimulus baseline, with epochs time-locked
to target onset. Trials with eye movements and blinks on any
recording channel (indicated by any absolute voltage difference in
a segment exceeding 80 mV or voltage steps between two sampling
Figure 1. An example trial sequence. Participants first fixated on a fixation dot for 850 ms. Subsequently, a robot or human face (Experiment 1)
or always a robot face (Experiment 2) gazing straight-ahead was presented for another 850 ms. Next, the gaze direction changed to either the left or
the right for another 600 ms, which was then followed by target presentation (30 ms) either at the gazed-at location (valid-cue trial) or the opposite
location (invalid-cue trials). Participants were then asked to respond to target identity, with a blank screen presented until the response. On catch
trials, the display with a face gazing to the left/right was presented for another 30 ms. The stimuli are depicted as presented on the computer screen,
with black outline squares representing the screen. The face stimuli were always presented with eyes at the level of the vertical midline of the screen,
and at the same level as the target stimulus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094339.g001
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points exceeding 50 mV) were excluded from analyses. Addition-
ally, channels with other artefacts were separately excluded if
amplitude exceeded 680 mV or any voltage was lower than
0.10 mV for a 100-ms interval. Only trials with correct responses
were analyzed. No off-line filters were applied for analyses (30-Hz
filters with 24 dB/Oct slope were applied to grand averages only
for purposes of illustration). One participant was excluded from
analyses due to extensive eye blinks. For each of the conditions of
interest, there were 120 repetitions, with, on average, 92
repetitions remaining after rejection of eye movement artefacts
(human valid: 91 trials; human invalid: 90 trials; human neutral:
93 trials; robot valid: 91 trials; robot invalid: 92 trials; robot
neutral: 94 trials). For target-absent (catch) trials, there were 90
trials for the human-face and 90 for the robot-face condition, with
67 remaining on average in each condition after eye movement
artifact rejection. Analyses were conducted on correct target-
present trials with ERPs time-locked to target onset. The two types
of target (F and T) as well as the side of presentation (left and right)
were averaged together. Target-absent (catch) trials were sub-
tracted from target-present trials, to eliminate overlapping
potentials related to gaze cue onset and, thus, extract the
potentials related to the targets. The subtraction was conducted
on epoched data, separately for each type of cue (human vs. robot),
each gaze direction (left vs. right), time-locked to target onset. The
analyses focused on the comparison between valid and invalid
trials. The EEG signal was averaged for the two validity conditions
(valid vs. invalid) and the two types of cue (human vs. robot). We
defined two regions of interest: left and right posterior-occipital
regions, by averaging activity at PO7 and O1 electrodes for the left
region and PO8 and O2 electrodes for the right region. Mean
amplitudes in the typical time window of the P1 (100–140 ms) and
N1 (150–190 ms) were subjected to ANOVAs with the factors
electrode site (left vs. right), cue type (human vs. robot), and cue validity
(valid vs. invalid). The P1 component time window
(120 ms620 ms) was selected based on grand average peak
amplitude (120 ms) in the 100–150-ms time window in the human
valid condition, where the P1 was most pronounced and where
this component is typically observed [28]. The N1 component
time window (170 ms620 ms) was selected based on the latency of
the grand average peak amplitude (170 ms) in the 140–200 ms
time window in the robot valid condition, where the N1
component was most pronounced and where this component is
typically observed [28]. Where appropriate, statistics were
corrected according to Greenhouse-Geisser for potential non-
sphericity. Planned comparisons were conducted for the valid vs.
invalid conditions in the human and robot face conditions
separately with one-tailed t-tests, due to directed a priori
hypothesis regarding the validity effect: validly cued targets should
elicit enhanced amplitudes for the P1/N1 time windows relative to
invalidly cued targets [10,18–20].
Behavioral data. Prior to the reaction time (RT) analysis,
trials with response errors or RTs faster than 150 ms and longer
1200 ms were excluded. Median RTs and mean error rates were
computed for each participant. The statistical analyses focused on
the comparison between valid and invalid trials. Individual median
RTs and mean error rates were submitted to a 262 analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with the factors cue type (human vs. robot) and
cue validity (valid, invalid). Planned comparisons were conducted for
the valid vs. invalid conditions in the human and robot face
conditions separately with one-tailed t-tests, due to directed a
priori hypothesis regarding the validity effect: validly cued targets
should elicit better performance than invalidly cued targets [5–
9,24]. The participant who was excluded from EEG analysis due
to extensive eye blinks was also excluded from the behavioral
analyses, as the frequent blinking could, in general, have affected
visual processing of the (briefly presented) target stimuli.
Results
ERP data. The 26262 ANOVA of the mean amplitudes in
the P1 time window (100–140 ms), with the factors cue validity
(valid vs. invalid), cue type (human vs. robot), and electrode site (left vs.
right), revealed the cue type x cue validity interaction to be
significant, F (1, 12) = 7.922, p = .016, gp
2 = .398, and uninfluenced
by electrode site (three-way interaction with electrode site: p = .31).
The main effect of cue type was not significant, F (1, 12) = 1.04,
p = .327. Note though that planned comparisons conducted
separately for the human- and robot-face conditions yielded only
marginally significant validity effects: (i) for the human-face
condition, the P1 amplitude was more positive for valid than for
invalid trials (Mvalid = 1.27 mV, SEM = .44 vs. Minvalid = .93 mV,
SEM = .43; t (12) = 1.52, p = .075, one-tailed; see Figure 2); (ii) for
the robot face condition, the validity effect tended to be reversed,
with a slightly less positive P1 amplitude for valid than for invalid
trials (Mvalid = .31 mV, SEM = .45 vs. Minvalid = .78 mV, SEM = .36; t
(12) = 1.77, p = .05, one-tailed; see Figure 2). However, a more
clear-cut picture emerged when the factor electrode site was
included in the (separate) analyses of the cue validity effects. In the
human-face condition, the validity effect interacted with electrode
site, F (1, 12) = 13.524, p = .003, gp
2 = .53: there was a significant
validity effect for the right posterior-occipital site, F (1, 12) = 8.584,
p = .013, gp
2 = .417, but not for the left site, p = .93 (see Figure 3).
The robot-face condition, by contrast, did not yield any significant
main effects or interactions of interest (validity effect: p = .103;
validity 6 electrode site interaction: p = .977). Note that there was
no indication that the effects of interest were lateralized in relation
to side of target presentation: an ANOVA that included the factor
target side (left vs. right) in addition to electrode site (left vs. right),
validity (valid vs. invalid), and cue type (human vs. robot) yielded
no evidence of a significant four-way interaction, p = .997. Note
further that visual inspection of the grand-averaged ERP
waveforms suggested a differential effect in a time window
preceding that of the P1 component, on the negative deflection
of the waveform; see Figure 2. However, statistical analysis on this
time window (60–100 ms) failed to yield any significant effects; in
particular, the interaction of cue and validity was non-significant,
F = .009, p = .926 (cue type, F = 1.609, p = .229, and validity,
F = .031, p = .862).
An analogous analysis for the later time window (150–190 ms)
of the N1 ERP component revealed a main effect of cue validity, F
(1, 12) = 8.059, p = .015, gp
2 = .402, with valid trials eliciting a
more negative mean amplitude (M = 22.33 mV, SEM = .5) com-
pared to invalid trials (M = 21.7 mV, SEM = .58). This effect was
not influenced by the type of cue, p = .79, or by electrode site,
p = .257; see Figure 2.
Behavior. The 262 ANOVA with the factors of cue type
(human vs. robot face) and validity (valid vs. invalid) on error rates
revealed the interaction to be significant, F (1, 12) = 5.902,
p = .032, gp
2 = .33, with the validity effect being more pronounced
for human than for robot faces (DER = 2% vs. DER = 20.4%).
Planned comparisons showed that for the human-face condition,
error rates were significantly lower for valid than for invalid trials
(Mvalid = 3.8%, SEM = .8 vs. Minalid = 5.7%, SEM = .9; t (12) = 2.44,
p = .015, one-tailed); by contrast, there was no difference between
these two types of trial in the robot-face condition (Mvalid = 5.2%;
Minvalid = 4.8%; p = .353, one-tailed).
An analogous analysis on the median RTs revealed no significant
main effects or interactions. Numerically, RTs were overall slightly
faster for valid than for invalid trials (Mvalid = 404 ms, SEM = 11 vs.
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Minvalid = 410 ms, SEM = 10), though the main effect of validity
was not significant: F (1, 12) = 3.46, p = .088, gp
2 = .224. Also,
the difference was numerically larger for human faces
(RTvalid = 405 ms; RTinvalid = 411 ms) than for robot faces
(RTvalid = 404 ms; RTinvalid = 408 ms), though not reliable statisti-
cally (cue type6cue validity interaction: F (1, 12) = .421, p = .529).
When both behavioral measures (RTs and accuracy) were
combined into a single dependent variable, namely: ‘‘inverse
efficiency scores (IES)’’ [29,30], by dividing individual median
RTs by individual accuracy scores (percentages of correct
responses), a 262 ANOVA with the factors cue type (human vs.
robot face) and validity (valid vs. invalid) revealed the interaction to
be marginally significant, F (1, 12) = 4.536, p = .055, gp
2 = .274,
with the validity effect being more pronounced for human faces
(DRT = 15 ms) than for robot faces (DRT = 3 ms). Planned
comparisons showed that for the human-face condition, the cue
validity effect was significant, t (12) = 2.739, p = .009, one-tailed; by
contrast, there was no significant effect for the robot-face condition
t (12) = .507, p = .311, one-tailed.
In order to examine whether physical dissimilarity between
human and robot gaze cues as such (or the slightly different
positioning of the human vs. robot face stimuli on the vertical axis
of the computer screen) has an influence on the amplitude of the
early sensory P1 component, we compared the neutral-trial P1
mean amplitude between the human- and robot-face conditions. A
262 ANOVA with the factors electrode site (left vs. right) and cue type
(robot vs. human) revealed no main effect of cue type, F (1,
12) = .093, p = .766, and no interaction with electrode site, F (1,
12) = .229, p = .641. The behavioral data, too, showed no
indication of differential processing on neutral trials between
robot and human faces: t (12) = .422, p = .68 for the error rates,
and t (12) = .628, p = .542 (two-tailed) for the median RTs; see
Table 1 for the mean RTs, error rates, and P1 amplitudes in the
neutral condition.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to eliminate the possibility that
physical differences between the two types of cue providers (or
their slightly different positions on the computer screen) were
responsible for the pattern of effects observed in Experiment 1,
rather than differences in mind-attribution. This alternative
explanation is unlikely, given that: (i) a comparison of the neutral
Figure 2. Grand average ERP waveforms time-locked to target onset and voltage distributions in Experiment 1. The depicted
waveforms (left) represent ERPs for the pool of O1/O2/PO7/PO8 electrodes, as a function of cue validity (solid lines: valid trials; dashed lines: invalid
trials) and type of cue provider (red: human faces, green: robot faces), in Experiment 1. The two types of targets (F and T) as well as left/right sides of
visual field were averaged together. The displayed ERPs are the subtracted waveforms (target present–target absent) and filtered with a 30-Hz high
cut-off filter (Butterworth zero phase, 24 dB/Oct) for illustration purposes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094339.g002
Figure 3. Topographical maps of voltage distribution (mean
amplitude) for the difference between the valid and invalid
conditions for the human face (left) and the robot face (right).
The time interval of the P1 component (100–140 ms) is presented in the
upper panel; the time interval of the N1 component (150–190 ms) is
presented in the lower panel. Voltage distribution maps are presented
from posterior view.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094339.g003
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trials between the human and the robot condition did not reveal
any significant P1 effects; (ii) valid trials were compared with
invalid trials within each of the two cue type conditions (robot,
human), rather than across conditions; and (iii) no main effect of
cue type was observed in either in the P1 or the N1 time window,
indicating that the amplitudes of those components were not
influenced by the type of stimulus as such. Nevertheless, it remains
critical to positively demonstrate that the modulation of sensory
gain control is attributable solely to the higher-order belief that the
gaze behavior was the result of the operations of a mind, rather
than of a machine; in other words, to experimentally isolate this
top-down modulation in order to rule out alternative explanations
of the P1 effect. To achieve this, in Experiment 2, we used only
one, physically identical cue provider across all conditions while
manipulating participants’ beliefs via instruction. Specifically,
participants were presented with the same robot face (gazing to
the left or the right; see Figure 1) across all conditions. Crucially, in
one experimental session, they were told that the robot’s gaze
behavior was pre-programmed (Instruction 1), and in the other
session, they were told that the eyes of the robot were controlled by
a human (Instruction 2).
Participants
Twenty-eight volunteers took part in the Experiment (19
women; mean age: 24.4 years; age range 19 to 34 years; 7 left-
handed; all with normal or corrected-to-normal vision; none of the
observers had taken part in any other experiment with such a
paradigm). Participants received an honorarium for their partic-
ipation. The experiments were conducted with written consent of
each participant. Experimental procedures were in accordance
with the Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association
(Declaration of Helsinki).
Procedure
Participants were seated in a dimly lit chamber with a keyboard
under their hands. Trial sequence was identical to that of
Experiment 1, except that only one type of gazer was presented
(robot face) and there were no neutral-cue trials (i.e., all gaze cues
were either valid or invalid on target-present trials). There were
altogether 960 trials, split into 2 sessions with two different
instructions (on the same day, with a 15–30 min break in
between). Each of the participants received both instructions
(Instruction 1: human-controlled, Instruction 2: pre-programmed),
with order counterbalanced across participants. Instructions were
provided to participants in German, in written form. Instruction 1
stated: ‘‘In this experiment, a picture of a robot will be displayed,
whose eye movements are in fact performed by a human. The
human’s eye movements are directly transferred in real-time to the
robot face through a computer. This way, the robot’s eyes can be
controlled by a human’’. Instruction 2 read: ‘‘In this experiment,
a picture of a robot will be displayed, whose eye movements
have been pre-programmed, so that they move according to a
pre-defined template’’. Participants who received Instruction 1 in
Session 1 received Instruction 2 in Session 2, with the additional
information: ‘‘The only difference from the first session of this
experiment is that in the present session, the eyes of the robot will
be controlled by a computer program, and not by a human’’; and
participants who received Instruction 2 in Session 1 read
Instruction 1 in Session 2, with the additional information: ‘‘The
only difference from the first session of this experiment is that in
the present session, the eyes of the robot will be controlled by a
human, and not by a computer program’’. The instructions also
specified the task (discrimination of the letters), key assignment,
number of blocks with estimated time; and provided pictures of the
face stimulus. They also stated that gaze direction of the robot face
would not be predictive of the target location in either the human-
controlled or the pre-programmed conditions.
Data analysis
We expected the validity effects (superior performance, and
enhanced amplitudes of the P1-N1 ERP complex, for valid- vs.
invalid-cue trials) to be modulated by instruction; thus, the main
factors of interest for all our analyses were: cue validity (valid vs.
invalid) and instruction (human-controlled vs. pre-programmed).
EEG data. The data were averaged over a 500-ms epoch (+
200-ms pre-stimulus baseline), time-locked to target onset. Trials
with eye movements and blinks on any recording channel were
excluded from analyses (absolute voltage difference in a segment
exceeding 80 mV or voltage steps between two sampling points
exceeding 50 mV on VEOG or HEOG). Additionally, channels
with other artefacts were excluded if amplitude exceeded 680 mV
or any voltage was lower than 0.10 mV for a 100-ms interval. No
off-line filters were applied for analyses (30-Hz filters with 24 dB/
Oct slope were applied to grand averages only for purposes of
illustration). Three participants were excluded from analyses due
to extensive eye blinks, and one due to abnormal alpha activity.
None of the remaining participants exhibited eye movements
deviating more than .2u from central fixation during the cue-target
interval (average differential activity, leftward-gaze trials subtract-
ed from rightward-gaze trials, on either of the HEOG channels,
F9 or F10, did not exceed 3.3 mV during presentation of the face
with directed gaze; for the procedure see [31]). One further
participant was excluded from analysis due to residual eye
movement activity after artefact rejection in the target-locked
interval (differential activity on the HEOG channels (right target
vs. left target) exceeded 3.3 mV, but did not exceed 5 mV = eye
movements deviating from fixation ,.3u [32]). For each of the
conditions of interest, there were 192 repetitions, with 171
repetitions remaining on average after eye movement rejection
(human-controlled valid: 173 trials; human-controlled invalid: 180
trials; pre-programmed valid: 170 trials; pre-programmed invalid:
161 trials).
Analyses were conducted on correct target-present trials with
ERPs time-locked to target onset. The two types of target (F and
Table 1. Mean RTs, error rates and mean amplitude of the P1 component (100–140 ms time window) for the neutral cue condition
(gaze straight-ahead) as a function of type of cue provider (human vs. robot).
Median RTs Mean error rates Mean P1 amplitude
Human 425 ms (12) 4.15% (.67) 1.223 mV (.68)
Robot 427 ms (10) 3.85% (.67) 1.379 mV (.53)
Standard errors of the mean are provided in brackets.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094339.t001
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T) as well as the side of presentation (left and right) were averaged
together. Target-absent (catch) trials were subtracted from target-
present trials to eliminate overlapping potentials related to gaze
cue onset and, thus, to isolate the potentials related to the targets.
The subtraction was conducted on epoched data, separately for
each type of instruction and each gaze direction, time-locked to
target onset. The EEG signal was averaged for the two validity
conditions and the two types of instruction. Mean amplitudes in
the time window of the P1 component (100–140 ms, i.e., 620 ms
from the latency of the grand average peak amplitude in the 100–
150-ms time window in the human valid condition, in which P1
was most pronounced; regarded as the typical P1 time window, in
line with [28]), as well as in the subsequent window of the N1
component (170–210 ms in Experiment 2; i.e., 620 ms from the
latency of the grand average peak amplitude in the 140–200-ms
time window in the robot valid condition, in which the N1 was
most pronounced) for the lateral posterior-occipital electrode sites
(left: O1/PO7 vs. right: O2/PO8) were subjected to ANOVAs
with the factors electrode site (left vs. right), instruction (human-
controlled vs. pre-programmed), and cue validity (valid vs. invalid).
Where appropriate, statistics were corrected according to Green-
house-Geisser for potential non-sphericity. Planned comparisons
of valid- vs. invalid-cue trials were performed separately for the
human-controlled and pre-programmed conditions using one-
tailed t-tests, given directed a-priori hypotheses regarding the
validity effects: validly cued targets should elicit enhanced
amplitudes in the P1/N1 time windows relative to invalidly cued
targets [10,18–20]. The average differential activity (target left –
target right) on HEOG channels was examined for the time
windows of interest (100–140 ms and, respectively, 170–210 ms
post target onset) as a function of cue validity and instruction.
Neither the main effect of validity nor the interaction of validity
and instruction were significant, for both windows of interest (both
Fs,1.4; ps..25).
Behavioral data. Prior to the reaction time (RT) analysis,
trials with response errors or RTs faster than 150 ms (regarded as
anticipations) and longer 1200 ms (regarded as exceptionally long
responses) were excluded. Median RTs and mean error rates were
computed for each participant. Individual median RTs and mean
error rates were submitted to a 262 ANOVA with the factors
instruction (human-controlled, pre-programmed) and cue validity
(valid, invalid). Planned comparisons of valid- vs. invalid-cue trials
were performed separately for the human-controlled and pre-
programmed conditions using one-tailed t-tests, given directed a-
priori hypotheses regarding the validity effects: validly cued targets
should elicit better performance relative to invalidly cued targets
[5–9,24]. The three participants who exhibited excessive blink or
eye movement artifacts in the EEG data, which might have
influenced visual processing of the stimuli, were also not included
in the behavioral analyses, too.
Results
ERP data. The 26262 ANOVA of the mean amplitudes in
the P1 time window (100–140 ms), with the factors cue validity
(valid, invalid), instruction (human-controlled, pre-programmed),
and electrode site (left vs. right), revealed the validity x instruction
interaction to be significant, F (1, 22) = 8.426, p = .008, gp
2 = .277,
with a significantly more positive P1 amplitude for valid than for
invalid trials in the human-controlled condition (Mvalid = 1.48 mV,
SEM = .3 vs. Minvalid = 1.27 mV, SEM = .3), t (22) = 1.78, p = .044,
one-tailed, and a slightly (non-significantly) less positive amplitude
for valid than for invalid trials in the pre-programmed condition
(Mvalid = 1.41 mV, SEM = .4 vs. Minalid = 1.53 mV, SEM = .4),
t (21) = 1.03, p = .15, one tailed (Figure 4).
The interaction between cue validity and instruction was not
influenced by electrode site (three-way interaction with electrode:
F(1, 22) = .04, p = .844); see Figure 5 for the voltage distribution.
There was no indication that the effects of interest were lateralized
in relation to side of target presentation: an ANOVA that included
the factor target side (left vs. right) in addition to electrode site (left
vs. right), validity (valid vs. invalid), and instruction (human-
controlled vs. pre-programmed) yielded no evidence of a
significant four-way interaction, p = .684.
An analogous analysis on the mean amplitudes in the N1 time
window (170–210 ms) revealed no main effect of validity, F (1,
22) = .153, p = .699, and no significant interaction of validity and
instruction, F (1, 22) = 2.683, p = .116.
Behavior. A 262 ANOVA of the median RTs with the
factors instruction (human-controlled, pre-programmed) and cue
validity (valid, invalid) showed that the ERP effects were paralleled
in the behavioral data: instruction type interacted with cue
validity, F (1, 24) = 5.47, p = .028, gp
2 = .186; with the validity
effect being significant in the human-controlled condition, t
(24) = 2.071, p = .025, one-tailed (Mvalid = 408 ms, SEM = 9 vs.
Minvalid = 411 ms, SEM = 10), but not in the pre-programmed condi-
tion, t (24) = .886, p = .192, one-tailed (Mvalid = 410 ms, SEM = 9 vs.
Minvalid = 409 ms, SEM = 10). Analogous analyses on the error rates
and inverse efficiency scores revealed no significant effects or
interactions, all Fs,2, ps..18 (error rates) and all Fs,3.3, ps..08
(inverse efficiency scores).
General Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether
early sensory processes are penetrable by higher-order cognitive
processes, such as beliefs about the observed scene. We examined
for modulations of the attention-related sensory gain control
mechanism with attention being guided by gaze. In our paradigm,
attentional orienting was induced by gaze shifts, and beliefs about
the observed gazer were manipulated either by the identity of the
face (Experiment 1) or solely by instruction, with the gazer’s
identity remaining identical across conditions (Experiment 2). We
hypothesized that attentional control over sensory processing (the
sensory gain control) would be enhanced when participants
believed that the observed gaze behavior was controlled by a
mind, rather than by a machine.
Our data support this hypothesis: In two experiments, the
target-locked P1 was more enhanced for the valid-cue, relative to
invalid-cue, trials, but only when the gazer’s behavior was believed
to result from operations of a mind. This ERP effect was paralleled
by the behavioral data: target-related performance was better on
valid-cue, relative to invalid-cue, trials when participants believed
the gazer had a mind and was not a machine, replicating previous
behavioral results [24] in a within-participants design. The ERP
and behavioral data are particularly intriguing because partici-
pants’ beliefs about the gazer were completely irrelevant to the
discrimination task they had to perform. Recall that participants in
the present study were expressly informed that gaze (shift)
direction was entirely non-predictive with respect to the target
location, in all experimental conditions. Accordingly, the pattern
of results obtained is unlikely attributable to participants having
formed differential expectations about cue validity, dependent on
whether they did or did not adopt the ‘Intentional Stance’ (see
below) towards the gazer.
Interestingly, the N1 validity effect was not modulated by cue
type in Experiment 1, and no validity or instruction effect on the
N1 was observed in Experiment 2. The P1 and N1 components
have previously been proposed to reflect different modes of control
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over sensory gain: the P1 has been argued to reflect a suppression
mechanism for ignored locations, whereas the N1 indexes
enhanced discriminative processing of stimuli at the attended
locations [11,18,33]. Given this, the differential effects between the
P1 and N1 suggest that when target stimuli are presented very
briefly, higher-level cognitive processes influence only the earlier,
suppression-related mechanism to increase the signal-to-noise
ratio, but not the later, discriminative processes at the attended
locations.
In sum, this is the first study to show that higher-order, task-
irrelevant beliefs about the observed scene can influence early
sensory processing by modulating stimulus-related neuronal
activity, dependent on whether the stimulus location has been
signaled by a meaningful social cue (gaze direction of an agent
with a mind) or not (gaze direction of a machine).
Theoretical considerations
The present findings can be interpreted along the idea that
humans adopt various ‘‘stances’’ in order to predict and
understand behavior of various systems with which they interact:
the Physical, the Design, or the Intentional Stance [34]. Based on
experience, humans know which stance works best for which
system. For example, when explaining the workings of a machine,
it is best to adopt the Design Stance (DS) and understand its
behavior with reference to how it is designed to behave. In
contrast, when explaining other humans’ behavior, the most
efficient strategy is to engage in mentalizing [35]: predicting and
understanding behavior with reference to particular mental states
(e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions).
However, we argue that before one can engage in mentalizing
(i.e., refer to any particular mental state), one needs to
fundamentally assume that the entity whose behavior one is
explaining is actually capable of having mental states. That is, one
needs to adopt the Intentional Stance (IS) towards the observed entity
by assuming that the entity has a mind. Our findings show that
attentional control over sensory processing (sensory gain control) is
exerted depending on whether or not one adopts the IS towards an
observed entity.
To account for these findings, we propose the Intentional Stance
Model (ISM) of social attention (Figure 6). According to the ISM,
when the brain adopts the IS towards A, A is represented as an
Figure 4. Grand average ERP waveforms time-locked to target onset in Experiment 2. The depicted waveforms represent ERPs for the
pool of O1/O2/PO7/PO8 electrodes, as a function of cue validity (solid lines: valid trials; dashed lines: invalid trials) and instruction (black: human-
controlled, gray: pre-programmed). The two types of targets (F and T) as well as left/right sides of visual field were averaged together. The displayed
ERPs are the subtracted waveforms (target present-target absent) and filtered with a 30-Hz high-cutoff filter (Butterworth zero phase, 24 dB/Oct) for
illustration purposes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094339.g004
Figure 5. Topographical maps of voltage distribution (mean
amplitude) for the difference between the valid and invalid
conditions for the human-controlled condition (left) and the
pre-programmed condition (right). The time interval of the P1
component (100–140 ms) is presented in the upper panel; the time
interval of the N1 component (170–210 ms) is presented in the lower
panel. Voltage distribution maps are presented from posterior view.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094339.g005
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agent with a mind. This representation allows for interpreting the
behavior of A with reference to particular mental states (i.e., to
mentalize). Importantly, the same behavior can be interpreted
without reference to mental states, if one assumes that A is a
mechanistic device and adopts the DS instead. For example, one
can explain A gazing at an apple either with reference to mental
states (A wants to eat the apple); or with reference to mechanistic
states (A’s machinery shifts the camera lens around).
As a result, mechanisms of social attention will be deployed at
various levels, dependent on whether IS is adopted or not; and,
accordingly, prioritization of processing of an object falling within
the focus of attention (the sensory gain control) will be engaged to
a higher (IS adopted) or lower degree (DS adopted).
Previous research has shown that mentalizing influences
perceptual processing [23]. Teufel and colleagues [23] proposed
the so-called perceptual mentalizing model (PMM) to account for these
mentalizing-dependent effects. According to PMM, when observ-
ers perform a gaze-cueing task, brain areas implicated in
mentalizing: the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ), generate signals which modulate neural
activity in social perception areas, such as the superior temporal
sulcus (STS). The STS in turn interacts with the parietal attention
mechanisms of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) in order to orient
attention in the direction of the gaze by increasing the
commitment of neural resources to the gazed-at location. One
limitation of the PMM, however, is that it does not account for the
impact of adopting the IS on sensory processing. As described
above, mentalizing logically and functionally presupposes adopting
the IS, because the brain must first assume that the observed entity
is actually capable of having mental states before it can infer the
mental states underlying particular behaviors.
The ISM overcomes this limitation by proposing a neurocog-
nitive machinery by which adopting the IS exerts top-down
influences on social attention, namely: feedback of IS predictions
to lower levels of the processing hierarchy, modulating the sensory
gain control. Based on the present findings, these modulations reach
as low as the extrastriate visual areas, where stimulus coding is
influenced by the sensory gain mechanism some 100 ms after gaze
cue onset. Whether the IS modulations can take effect even earlier
(before 100 ms) and in even lower visual areas, such as V1,
remains to be established in future research. This might well be the
case, as previous studies have shown that top-down control
mechanisms can affect perceptual processing in areas as low as V1,
as early as 55–90 ms after cue onset [37–39].
Figure 6. The Intentional Stance Model (ISM) of social attention. A visual stimulus (the robot face, bottom) is processed in the visual pathway
from the lowest-level (early visual areas box) to higher-level areas (e.g., STS). The Attentional Network (IPS) is involved in orienting attention to the
stimulus (the letter F) that is cued by the gaze. One of the core claims of ISM is that mentalizing is dependent on the Intentional Stance (IS), because it
logically and functionally presupposes the adoption of the IS. Adopting the IS (or DS) occurs most probably in the anterior paracingulate cortex (36)
and feeds back to the parietal attentional mechanisms, subsequently modulating the sensory gain control in the extrastriate visual areas (right). When
observing an entity’s gaze behavior while adopting the IS, this higher-order belief modulates the sensory gain control in the extrastriate areas,
increasing the priority of an item cued by the gaze (represented by a higher peak of neural activity on the right; the other peak depicts an invalidly
cued object). This additional prioritization does not occur when the brain adopts the DS. Thus, beliefs about the mind of others influence one’s own
mind. LGN = lateral geniculate nucleus, V1 = primary visual cortex, STS = superior temporal sulcus, IPS = intraparietal sulcus, mPFC = medial
prefrontal cortex, TPJ = temporo-parietal junction. Processes of social cognition and perception that are the focus of this paper and are essential for
the core claims of the ISM are highlighted in black and color, while gray boxes represent other processes of social perception/cognition that are not
in the focus of this paper.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094339.g006
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The functional necessity of modulatory predictions in social
perception is also suggested by recent findings implicating the
dorsal and ventral medial PFC and ventral striatum in the
functional neuroanatomy underlying joint attention [40,41]. This
is noteworthy as the dorsal medial PFC is involved not just in
mentalizing [23] but also in adopting the Intentional Stance [36],
whereas the ventral medial PFC and ventral striatum are involved
in reward predictions and value-based choices [42–44]. Given the
strong evolutionary grounds for why social interactions may be
intrinsically rewarding and valuable [41,45,46], future research
should focus on elaborating the link among reward, predicted
value, and social cognition/perception.
Furthermore, it is worth considering the ISM in light of the
‘‘second-person approach’’ to mentalizing [46], which stresses
emotional engagement and social interactions with others as the
driving mechanisms for mentalizing. On this view, knowledge of
other minds emerges by virtue of being embedded in and coupled
with the world in a particular manner [46], where emotional
engagement refers to the degree of responsiveness between agents,
and social interaction to the ‘‘reciprocal relations with the
perception of socially relevant information prompting (re-) actions,
which are themselves processed and reacted to’’ ([46], p. 397).
While it is clearly important to take into account that the manner
of our coupling with the environment determines how we
understand other minds, ISM emphasizes that a purely embodied
or embedded approach to mentalizing should not downplay the
causal centrality of internal representations. This is because the
very concepts of ‘‘emotion’’, ‘‘responsiveness’’, and ‘‘social
relevance’’ presuppose – both logically and functionally – that
the brain has represented the observed entity it is responding to
and interacting with as being actually capable of having mental
states (i.e., adopted the IS). This does not, however, preclude
bottom-up signals (e.g., the behavior of the interacting partner)
from driving mentalizing, or from having an influence on adopting
the Intentional Stance. In fact, Pfeiffer et al. [47] showed that
attribution of humanness (and thereby presumably adoption of the
IS) depended on the observed behavior of an avatar and on prior
beliefs regarding particular mental states underlying the behavior.
It remains to be examined to what extent adopting the IS is driven
by the bottom-up, interactive aspects of social cognition versus a-
priori beliefs and assumptions. Importantly, what ISM proposes is
that mentalizing functionally depends upon a particular type of
higher-order representations that we collectively refer to as the
‘‘Intentional Stance’’.
To conclude, the present study showed that a general
perceptual selection mechanism – sensory gain control – is
governed not just by intrinsically visual factors, such as spatial or
feature-based selection, but is sensitive to higher-order task-
irrelevant beliefs about others. This implies that mechanisms of
early perceptual selection exhibit a high degree of flexibility and
penetrability to top-down control.
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